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Abstract. In this paper, we identify sufficient conditions under which static teams and a class of
sequential dynamic teams admit team-optimal solutions. We first investigate the existence of optimal
solutions in static teams where the observations of the decision makers are conditionally independent
or satisfy certain regularity conditions. Building on these findings and the static reduction method
of Witsenhausen, we then extend the analysis to sequential dynamic teams. In particular, we show
that a large class of dynamic LQG team problems, including the vector version of the well-known
Witsenhausen’s counterexample and the Gaussian relay channel problem viewed as a dynamic team,
admit team-optimal solutions. Results in this paper substantially broaden the class of stochastic
control and team problems with non-classical information known to have optimal solutions.
1. Introduction. A team is a group of agents who act collectively, but not nec-
essarily sharing all the information, in order to optimize a common cost function. In
stochastic teams, there may be probabilistic uncertainty about initial state, observa-
tions or cost functions, and/or the evolution of the state is disturbed by some external
noise process. The statistics of the noise processes, state evolution equations and ob-
servation equations are common knowledge among the agents of a team. At every
time step, each agent acquires some information about the state via its observation,
may acquire other agents’ past and current observations and past actions, and may
recall its past observations and actions. If each agent’s information is only determined
by primitive/exogenous random variables, the team is said to be a static team. If at
least one agent’s information is affected by an action of another agent, the team is
said to be dynamic. The information structure in a team determines such functional
and probabilistic relations in that team.
A system in which there is a pre-specified order of actions is said to be a sequential
team. In non-sequential teams, the ordering of “who acts when” is not known a priori,
and ordering of actions may be determined by the outcome of some random process
[3]. In this paper, we focus our attention on the existence of optimal strategies in
sequential dynamic teams. A sequential team in which the information available to
the decision makers in forward time is non-contracting is said to be a classical team
(such settings include the well-studied single-agent Markov Decision Problems with
full memory). A sequential team, which is not classical, but has the property that
whenever an agent’s, say Ak’s, information is affected by the action of some other
agent, say Aj, Ak has access to Aj’s information, is said to have a quasi-classical (or
partially nested) information structure. An information structure which is not quasi-
classical is said to be non-classical. For an extensive discussion on classifications of
information structures, the reader is referred to [4] and [5].
We next provide a brief overview of the early developments in the area of teams
with asymmetric information, as is relevant to this paper. In 1962, Radner published
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a seminal paper on team decision problems [6] where he showed that a class of static
stochastic teams with continuously differentiable and strictly convex cost functions
admit globally optimal (minimizing) solutions which are also the unique person-by-
person-optimal solutions; this result was later extended by Krainak et al [7] to settings
with exponential cost functions. A byproduct of Radner’s result is that in static
linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) team problems, linear strategies of the agents that
are person-by-person optimal are also team-optimal. Furthermore, partially nested
LQG teams also admit linear optimal solutions, as was observed by Ho and Chu [8, 9].
When the information structure is non-classical, however, Witsenhausen showed that
even seemingly simple LQG settings can be very difficult to solve [10]: He devised a
scalar LQG team problem which admits an optimal solution, which, however, is not
linear.
Obtaining solutions of classical dynamic team problems is quite well understood,
with dynamic programming providing the most convenient approach. For dynamic
teams not of the classical type, however, there is no systematic approach which is uni-
versally applicable; see [11], [5], [12] for a detailed coverage and analysis of the various
solution approaches, which also depend on the underlying information structure.
In this paper, we prove that a class of sequential teams with a certain information
structure (not-necessarily classical or quasi-classical) admits team-optimal solutions.
This constitutes a first step toward understanding the most general conditions under
which stochastic dynamic team problems admit optimal solutions. The results ob-
tained and the general framework adopted are applicable to various models of team
problems that are studied in economics, information theory, network information the-
ory, and stochastic control.
1.1. Previous Work. Some of the earliest and most fundamental works on un-
derstanding the role of information in general dynamic stochastic teams were carried
out by Witsenhausen in [4, 10, 13, 14]. Among these fundamental contributions, in
[14] Witsenhausen showed that all sequential team problems satisfying an absolute
continuity condition of certain conditional measures can be transformed into an equiv-
alent static team problem with a different cost function and with the agents observing
mutually independent random variables. This transformation of a dynamic team into
a static team problem with independent observations is called “static reduction” of
the dynamic team problem (see Section 3.7 and particularly p. 114 of [5] both for a
discussion on this reduction as well as an overview of Witsenhausen’s contributions).
In this paper, we make use of this equivalence between dynamic and static team prob-
lems to show the existence of optimal strategies in the original dynamic team problem.
Recently, [15] has studied continuous-time stochastic team decision problems that are
partly driven by Brownian motion, and has shown that the static reduction of the
dynamic team problem can be carried out using the Girsanov transformation.
The existence of optimal strategies for Witsenhausen’s counterexample was proved
in Witsenhausen’s original paper [10], where his proof relied on the structure of the
cost function of the team. In that problem, the unique optimal strategy of the second
agent involves the conditional mean of the control action of the first agent using an
observation that is an additive noise corrupted version of the control action of the first
agent, where the noise is a zero-mean unit variance Gaussian random variable. When
substituted back, this makes the expected cost functional of the team a non-convex
functional on the space of strategies of the first agent. Witsenhausen used several
techniques from real analysis to show that an optimal strategy of the first agent exists
when the initial state of the system is an arbitrary second-order random variable. A
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shorter proof of existence for this problem was later presented by Wu and Verdú [16]
using tools from optimal transport theory. One variant of this problem is the Gaussian
test channel; there are other variants as well, all with non-classical information [17].
For the Gaussian test channel, proof of existence of optimal strategies (and their
derivations) is an indirect one. First, the cost function is lower bounded using the data
processing inequality [18], and then explicit linear strategies are constructed which
make the cost achieve the lower bound. Proofs of existence of optimal strategies in
some other teams with non-classical information using this method can be found in
[19].
The main difference between the formulations of Witsenhausen’s counterexample
and the Gaussian test channel is in the cost functions (even though they are both
quadratic) [19, 17]. In the case of Witsenhausen’s counterexample, the explicit forms
of optimal strategies are not known, whereas in the case of the Gaussian test channel,
linear strategies are optimal; more importantly, in both problems (where all random
variables are jointly Gaussian), optimal solutions exist. If, however, the distributions
of the primitive random variables are discrete with finite support, there is no optimal
solution even in the class of behavioral strategies of the agents as illustrated in [5,
p. 90]. Thus, the question of sufficient conditions for a team problem to admit an
optimal solution is an important one, which is addressed in this paper.
Several authors have proven the existence of optimal solutions to stochastic op-
timization problems through “lifting”. Specifically, the problem of optimizing an ex-
pected cost functional on the space of Borel measurable functions is lifted to an
equivalent optimization problem in which the cost functional is defined on the space
of probability measures. This technique is heavily used in proving the existence of
optimal strategies in Markov decision processes; see for example, [20, 21, 22], among
several others. This is also the central concept for studying optimal transport prob-
lems [23, 24], where the cost function is a measurable function of two random variables
with given distributions, and the optimization is performed on the space of joint mea-
sures of the random variables given the marginal distributions. In this paper, we use
a similar lifting technique to establish the existence of optimal strategies in a class of
static and dynamic teams.
A variant of the problem of existence of optimal strategies in stochastic dynamic
teams is that of the existence of optimal observation channels in such systems. The
relevant question there is how to design observation channels (for example, quantizers)
in a team problem so that the overall expected cost is minimized. This problem was
studied in [25], where some sufficient conditions were obtained on teams and sets
of observation channels to ensure the existence of optimal quantizers. There again,
the problem of designing quantizers was lifted to one of designing joint probability
measures over the state and the observation of an agent satisfying certain constraints.
In [25], a topology of information channels was introduced based on a fixed input
distribution. Related approaches can be found in [26, 27]. In this paper, we further
generalize these approaches.
1.2. Outline of the paper. We prove, under some sufficient conditions, the
existence of optimal strategies in a class of sequential team problems. A general
stochastic dynamic team problem is formulated in Section 2. Thereafter, we study
two related static team problems in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 3, we show that if
the cost function of the team is continuous and bounded, and action spaces are com-
pact, then under mild conditions on the observation kernels, a team optimal solution
exists. In Section 4, we extend the result to the case when the action spaces may not
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be compact and the cost function of the team is a non-negative continuous, possibly
unbounded function. In Section 5, we show, using the static reduction technique of
Witsenhausen [14], that a large class of dynamic team problems admit team-optimal
solutions. We use this result to show, in Section 6, that most LQG teams with no
sharing of observation admit team-optimal solutions. In Section 7, we prove the exis-
tence of optimal strategies in several LQG team problems of broad interest. Finally,
we present concluding remarks in Section 8.
1.3. Notation. We introduce here some of the notation used throughout the
paper. For a natural number N , we let [N ] denote the set {1, . . . , N}. The set of all
non-negative real numbers is denoted by R+. If X is a set and A is a subset of X ,
then A{ denotes the complement of the set A.
We use boldfaced letters a,b, . . . to denote generic elements in sets A, B and
so on. If the space X is the real space, then we simply use x to denote a generic
element of X , with no boldface. Uppercase boldfaced letters, for example X, are used
to denote random variables. A superscript denotes the index of an agent, while a
subscript denotes the time step or an index of a sequence. For example, Uit denotes
the control action taken by Agent i at time step t. If a ∈ Rn, then we use ‖a‖2R to
denote aTRa, for a positive-definite matrix R.
Let X be a non-empty set. For a set of elements {x1, . . . , xn} in X, we let x1:n
denote this set. The set {x1, . . . , xn} \ {xi} is denoted by x−i. If X1, . . . , Xn are
non-empty sets, then X1:n and X−i are shorthand notations for the product sets
X1 × . . . × Xn and X1 × . . . × Xi−1 × Xi+1 × . . . × Xn, respectively. If we write
x1:n ∈ X1:n, then it is construed as x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, and so on. Similarly, x1:n
denotes the set {x1, . . . , xn}, and x1:n1:t denotes {x11, . . . , xn1 , . . . , x1t , . . . , xnt }, where each
element is in the appropriate space.
Let X be a topological space. The vector space of all bounded continuous func-
tions on X endowed with the supremum norm ‖ · ‖∞ is denoted by Cb(X ), that is,
Cb(X ) := {f : X → R : f is continuous and ‖f‖∞ < ∞}. The vector space C(X ) is
the space of all continuous functions on the topological space X , which are possibly
unbounded. Thus, Cb(X ) ⊂ C(X ). If X is a metric space, then the vector space
Ub(X ) ⊂ Cb(X ) denotes the set of all bounded uniformly continuous functions on X .
The Borel σ-algebra on X is denoted byB(X ). The spaces ca(X ) and ℘(X ) denote, re-
spectively, the vector space of countably additive signed measures on X and the set of
all probability measures on X endowed with weak* topology. If µi ∈ ℘(Ai), i ∈ [N ] are
probability measures, then dµ1:N denotes the product measure µ1(da1) · · ·µN (daN ).
We let 1{·} denote the Dirac probability measure over the point {·}.
We now define push-forward of a measure [23, pp. 118], which we use throughout
the paper.
Definition 1.1 (Push-Forward of a measure [23]). Let A and B be two separable
metric spaces, µ ∈ ℘(A), and r : A → B a Borel measurable map. Then, a push-
forward of µ through r, denoted by r#µ ∈ ℘(B), is defined as r#µ(B) := µ(r−1(B))
for all Borel sets B ⊂ B. 
Remark 1.1. Let PrA : A×B → A be the projection map. Let µ ∈ ℘(A×B) be a
joint measure. Then, for any Borel set A ⊂ A, PrA#µ(A) := µ(A×B) is the marginal
of the joint measure µ. 
2. Problem Formulation. Within a state-space model, we consider anN -agent
dynamic team problem with no observation sharing information structure. Let the
state at time instant t ∈ [T ] be denoted by Xt, and the space of all possible states
at time t be denoted by Xt. The action of Agent i at time t lies in a space U it ,
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and its action is denoted by Uit. The agents observe the plant states and past control
actions through noisy sensors (or channels), and the observation of Agent i at time t is
denoted by Yit, which lies in a space Yit . Throughout the paper, the spaces Xt,U it ,Yit
are assumed to be complete separable metric spaces (also called Polish spaces, such
as Rn or the space of measures over Rn) at all time steps t ∈ [T ] and for all agents
i ∈ [N ].
The state of the system evolves according to
Xt+1 = f˜t(X1:t,U
1:N
1:t ,W
0
t ), t ∈ [T ], (2.1)
where W0t is the actuation noise on the system. We denote the realization space of
all possible actuation noises by W0t . Agent i at time t ∈ [T ] makes an observation
which depends on past states and control actions according to
Yit = h˜
i
t(X1:t,U
1:N
1:t−1,W
i
t), (2.2)
where Wit, which takes values in the space Wit , is the observation noise of Agent i
at time t. We again assume that Wit , i ∈ {0} ∪ [N ], t ∈ [T ] are Polish spaces. We
make the following assumption on the state transition functions and the observation
functions of the agents.
Assumption 2.1. The state transition functions f˜t and observation functions
h˜it, i ∈ [N ], are continuous functions of their arguments for all time steps t ∈ [T ]. 
The random variables {X1,W0:N1:T } are primitive random variables, and are as-
sumed to be mutually independent. We let ξX1 denote the probability measure on X1
and ξWit denote the probability measure on Wit for i ∈ {0} ∪ [N ] and t ∈ [T ].
2.1. Information Structures and Strategies of the Agents. At each in-
stant of time, we assume that the only information each agent acquires is its own
observation, that is, Iit := Yit. Each agent uses its information to determine its con-
trol action. Toward this end, we allow the agents to act in a predetermined fashion,
and when they act they either choose a deterministic strategy, or a randomized or
behavioral strategy. We define these two notions of strategies below:
Definition 2.1 (Deterministic Strategy). A deterministic strategy for an Agent
i at time t is a Borel measurable map γit : Yit → U it . Let Dit be the space of all such
maps, which we call the deterministic strategy space of Agent i ∈ [N ] at time t ∈ [T ].
Definition 2.2 (Behavioral Strategy). A behavioral strategy of Agent i at time
t is a conditional measure piit satisfying the following two properties:
1. For every yit ∈ Yit , piit(·|yit) ∈ ℘(U it );
2. For every U ∈ B(U it ), yit 7→ piit(U|yit) is a B(Yit)-measurable function.
Let Rit denote the behavioral strategy space of Agent i ∈ [N ] at time t ∈ [T ]. 
Remark 2.1. For an agent at any time step, any deterministic strategy is by
definition also a behavioral strategy. For example, if γit is a deterministic strategy of
Agent i at time t, then the corresponding (induced) behavioral strategy is piit(duit|yit) =
1{γit(yit)}(du
i
t). Thus, the set of behavioral strategies of an agent subsumes the set of
deterministic strategies of that agent. 
As a consequence of the remark above, throughout this paper, we will work with
behavioral strategies of an agent with the understanding that this also covers deter-
ministic strategies of that agent as well.
2.2. Expected Cost Functional of the Team. The team is equipped with
a cost function c˜, which is assumed to be a non-negative continuous function of all
states X1:T+1, observations Y1:N1:T and actions U
1:N
1:T of the agents. However, we can
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substitute (2.1) recursively so that the cost function becomes purely a function of the
primitive random variables {X1,W01:T }, observations Y1:N1:T and the control actions of
all agents, U1:N1:T . Therefore, for a fixed realization of the primitive random variables,
observations and control actions of the agents, the cost incurred by the team can be
written as c(x1,w01:T ,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T ) for some c, which is clearly related to c˜. We have
the following result on the cost function c.
Lemma 2.3. If Assumption 2.1 holds, then the cost function c is continuous.
Proof. Note that by construction, c is generated by c˜ as
c(x1,w
0
1:T ,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T ) = c˜(x1, f˜1(x1,u
1:N
1 ,w
0
1), · · · , f˜T (x1:T ,u1:N1:T ,w0T ),y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T ),
where xt is substituted as a function of x1,w01:t−1 and u1:N1:t−1 using (2.1) for all t ∈ [T ].
Since c˜ and {ft}t∈[T ] are continuous functions of their arguments, we conclude that c
is a continuous function on X1 ×W01:T × Y1:N1:T × U1:N1:T .
In standard optimal control problems, the cost function of the team is taken
to be a sum of stage-wise cost functions, in which the cost function at every time
step depends on the current state and actions of the agents. However, we do not
assume such a structure on the cost function of the team problem considered in this
paper. This general cost function encompasses ones that appear in certain classes of
communication systems, economic systems, and feedback control over noisy channels.
Throughout this paper, we use J : R1:N1:T → R+ to denote the expected cost
functional of the team, which is defined as
J(pi1:N1:T ) = E
[
c(x1,w
0
1:T ,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T )
]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the measure induced on the random
variables by the choice of behavioral strategies pi1:N1:T . We make the following natural
assumption on the team problem described above.
Assumption 2.2. There exists a set of behavioral strategies p˜i1:N1:T ∈ R1:N1:T of the
agents, which results in finite expected cost to the team. 
2.3. Solution Approach and the Proof Program. Our proof of existence of
optimal strategies in team problems formulated above follows the following steps:
1. We first show the existence of optimal strategies in a static team problem in
Section 3, in which (i) the cost function of the team is continuous and bounded
function of its arguments, (ii) the action spaces of the agents are compact,
and (iii) the observation channels of the agents satisfy a technical assumption.
We refer to this static team problem as Team ST1. We establish a tightness
result on the joint measures over state, observation and action spaces of each
agent. For any sequence of joint measures induced by behavioral strategies
of the agents that achieves expected costs converging to the infimum of the
expected cost of the team, we show that there exists a convergent subsequence
of joint measures, which are induced by a set of behavioral strategies, whose
limit achieves the infimum of the expected cost functional of the team.
2. Next, we show the existence of optimal strategies in a static team problem
in which (i) the action spaces of the agents are non-compact and (ii) cost
function of the team is continuous and has a coercive structure. We refer to
this static team problem as Team ST2. This result is established in Section
4 using the results of Section 3.
3. Subsequently, we use Witsenhausen’s static reduction technique to reduce a
sequential dynamic team into a (reduced) static team with independent ob-
servations of the agents. We assume a certain structure on the cost function of
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the dynamic team. A challenge with this approach is that the cost function of
the reduced static team problem may not satisfy a coercivity condition (intro-
duced later) even though the cost function of the dynamic team satisfies that
coercivity condition. To alleviate this problem, we provide a novel approach
by restricting the search for optimal behavioral strategies to a compact set.
The dynamic team problem is then solved under some mild assumptions that
are delineated in Section 5.
In the next section, we establish the existence of team-optimal solutions to the
first static team problem mentioned above.
3. Existence of Optimal Solution in ST1. In this section, we study the N -
agent static team problem in which each Agent i observes a random variable Yi,
correlated with the random variable X, and takes an action Ui. We let X denote the
state space of the team, and Yi and U i denote, respectively, the observation space
and action space of Agent i. We assume that U i is a compact subset of a Polish space
for all i ∈ [N ].
The team incurs a cost c, which is a non-negative continuous function of the state,
observations and the control actions of all the agents, that is, c : X ×Y1:N ×U1:N →
R+. The expected cost functional of the team, denoted by J : R1:N → R+, as a
function of behavioral strategies of the agents, is
J(pi1:N ) =
∫
X×U1:N
∫
Y1:N
c(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
N∏
i=1
pii(dui|yi)P{dx, dy1, . . . , dyN} .
We show that, under certain conditions, there exists a pi1:N? ∈ R1:N such that
J(pi1:N?) = inf
pi1:N∈R1:N
J(pi1:N ).
We first provide an outline of our approach to showing the existence of optimal
strategies in the static team problem. Consider a sequence {pi1:Nn }n∈N ⊂ R1:N of
control strategies of the agents such that limn→∞ J(pi1:Nn ) = infpi1:N∈R1:N J(pi1:N ).
There are three issues that need to be resolved: The first issue is that the se-
quence of joint measures
{∏N
i=1 pi
i
n(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1, . . . , dyN}}
n∈N
may not be
a weak* convergent sequence. This can be remedied by considering a convergent
subsequence of
{∏N
i=1 pi
i
n(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1, . . . , dyN}}
n∈N
. The second problem is
to ensure that the limit of the convergent subsequence satisfies the informational
constraint. This means that the conditional measure on the action space of Agent
i given the observation of that agent and the state of the limiting measure must
be independent of the state for any i ∈ [N ]. The third problem is that if for all
i ∈ [N ], {piin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dyi
}}n∈N converges in the weak* sense to a measure
pii0(du
i|yi)P{dx, dyi} for some pii0 ∈ Ri, then the expected cost functional J may
not satisfy limn→∞ J(pi1:Nn ) = J(pi1:N0 ). We overcome all these three challenges by
employing the following steps:
1. We show that for any g ∈ Ub(X×Y1:N×U1:N ),
{∫
g piin(du
i|yi)P{dyi|x}}
n∈N
is a uniformly equicontinuous and bounded sequence of functions under some
assumptions on the conditional measure P
{
dyi|x}.
2. In order to satisfy the informational constraint of the limiting measure of
any convergent subsequence of the sequence {piin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dyi
}}n∈N, we
assume a specific structure on the conditional probability measure P
{
dx|yi}.
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3. We extract a weak* convergent subsequence{
N∏
i=1
piink(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1, . . . , dyN}}
k∈N
of the sequence of measures such that limk→∞ J(pi1:Nnk ) = J(pi
1:N
0 ).
4. Once we show that there exists a set of behavioral strategies of the agents
that achieves the minimum expected cost, we use Blackwell’s irrelevant infor-
mation theorem [5, p. 457] to conclude that there exists a set of deterministic
strategies of the agents that achieves the minimum expected cost.
In order to prove existence, we require several auxiliary results that are proved in
the next subsection. The purpose of the auxiliary results is to establish results 1 and
2 above in a somewhat general setting. The existence of optimal strategies is proven
in Subsection 3.2. We also show in that subsection the existence of optimal strategies
in static teams when the state is degenerate and the observations of the agents are
mutually independent random variables.
Remark 3.1. Without the further regularity conditions to be presented shortly,
the approach above may not be sufficient to lead to the desired existence result for
teams in which the information of the agents given the state are not conditionally in-
dependent. This is the case, for example, when observations are shared by the agents
in a team. In Appendix A, a counterexample of a two-agent static team is given,
in which one agent shares its observation with another agent. We show that even if
sequences of the joint measures of each agent’s action and information (which may in-
clude another agent’s observation too) converge in the weak* sense, the corresponding
sequence of joint measures over the product of all action, observation, and state spaces
need not converge. This counterexample shows that additional regularity conditions
on the cost function, observation channels, underlying distributions of primitive ran-
dom variables, and topologies on measure spaces are needed to establish the existence
of optimal strategies in general static and dynamic teams where observations may be
shared. 
3.1. Auxiliary Results. In this subsection, we state a few lemmas that are
needed to prove the existence of optimal strategies in the static team problem for-
mulated above. Unless otherwise stated, A, Bi, C and Yi, i ∈ [N ] denote Polish
spaces, with generic elements in these spaces denoted, respectively, by a, bi, c and
yi. We now introduce a condition on the conditional probability measures, which will
be important in proving the auxiliary results.
Definition 3.1 (Condition C1). Let A and Y be random variables such that
P {dy|a} = η(a,y)ν(dy) for some non-negative measure ν ∈ ca(Y). We say that the
pair (η, ν) satisfies condition C1 if and only if
1. η is a continuous function of its arguments, that is, η ∈ C(A× Y); and
2. there exists a bounded measurable function h(η,ν) : A × Y → R+ satisfying
supa∈A
∫
h(η,ν)dν < ∞, such that for every  > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such
that for any a0 ∈ A and for all a ∈ A satisfying dA(a,a0) < δ, we have
|η(a,y)− η(a0,y)| <  h(η,ν)(a0,y).
We call h(η,ν) the variation control (VC) function of the pair (η, ν). 
If the observation is an additive noise corrupted version of the state, with the
noise being Gaussian, then the above condition holds. This is noted in the following
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example.
Example 1. Let A = Y = Rn. A sufficient condition for a pair (η, ν) to satisfy
condition C1 is Y = A + W for some Gaussian random vector W with density
function N(·) and a positive definite covariance. In this case, ν is the usual Lebesgue
measure on Rn, η(a,y) = N(y − a), and the VC function for the pair (η, ν) is
h(η,ν)(a0,y) := max
a∈B(a0,1)
∥∥∥∥dηda
∥∥∥∥
2
.
Since dηda decays exponentially as ‖y‖2 →∞, h(η,ν) has the property that
∫
h(η,ν)dν <
∞ and it is a constant function over A. 
Now, we make use of the uniform continuity of a function and Condition C1 on
the conditional measure to prove the following result.
Lemma 3.2. Let ν ∈ ca(Y) be a non-negative measure and µ ∈ ℘(Y × B). Let
A, B, C and Y be random variables such that P {dy|a} = η(a,y)ν(dy), where the
pair (η, ν) satisfies condition C1 with VC function h(η,ν). Let g : A× B × C → R be
a uniformly continuous and bounded function. Define the map f : A× C → R by
fµ(a, c) =
∫
B
g(a,b, c)µ(db|y)η(a,y)ν(dy).
Then, {fµ(·, ·)}µ∈℘(Y×B) is a uniformly equicontinuous and bounded map on its do-
main.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We now have a corollary to this result.
Corollary 3.3. Under the same assumptions and notation as in Lemma 3.2,
for every µ ∈ ℘(Y × B), fµ is a uniformly continuous function on its domain.
We now state another important lemma, whose proof is similar to the proof of
Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.4. Let νi ∈ ca(Yi) be a non-negative measure and µi ∈ ℘(Yi × Bi),
i ∈ [N ]. Let A, Bi, C and Yi be random variables for i ∈ [N ] such that P{dyi|a} =
ηi(a,yi)νi(dyi), where each pair (ηi, νi) satisfies condition C1 with VC function hi.
Further, assume that random variables Y1, . . . ,YN are independent given a. Let
g ∈ Ub(A× B1:N × C). Define the map f : A× C → R by
fµ1:N (a, c) =
∫
B1:N
g(a,b1:N , c)
N∏
i=1
µi(dbi|yi)ηi(a,yi)νi(dyi).
Then, {fµ1:N (·, ·)}µi∈℘(Yi×Bi) is a uniformly equicontinuous and bounded map on its
domain.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The result of Lemma 3.4 allows us to apply Arzela-Ascoli Theorem [28] on compact
subsets of the domain to obtain a convergent subsequence that converges to some
bounded continuous function pointwise (not in sup norm). We then need the following
result.
Lemma 3.5. Under the same assumptions and notation as in Lemmas 3.2 and
3.4, let {µin}n∈N ⊂ ℘(Yi × Bi) be an arbitrary sequence of measures for i ∈ [N ]. For
every n ∈ N, define fn := fµ1:Nn . Further, assume that A, C,Yi,Bi, i ∈ [N ] are all
σ-compact Polish spaces. If {ζn}n∈N ⊂ ℘(A × C) is a weak* convergent sequence of
measures converging to ζ0, then there exists a subsequence {nk}k∈N such that
lim
k→∞
∣∣∣∣ ∫A×C fnkdζnk −
∫
A×C
fnkdζ0
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
9
Proof. See Appendix D.
We have thus stated (and proved) all the major auxiliary results that are needed
to establish the existence of optimal strategies. We next prove an additional result,
which states that under some sufficient condition, if we take a weak* convergent
sequence of measures satisfying a conditional independence property, then the limit
also satisfies the conditional independence property. This result is useful to show
that the weak* convergent sequence of joint measures over the state, observation and
action of Agent i does not converge to a limit in which the control action depends on
both the state and the observation.
Lemma 3.6. Let {µn}n∈N ⊂ ℘(A× B × C) be a convergent sequence of measures
such that µn(da, db, dc) = µn(dc|b)ζ(da, db), where ζ ∈ ℘(A × B) with the property
that ζ(da|b) = ρ(a,b)ν(da) for some ρ ∈ Cb(A× B) and non-negative measure ν on
A. Assume that (ρ, ν) satisfies Condition C1. If µn w
∗
⇀ µ0 for some µ0 ∈ ℘(A×B×C),
then µ0(da, db, dc) = µ0(dc|b)ζ(da, db).
Proof. See Appendix E.
In the next subsection, we turn our attention to proving the existence of optimal
strategies for the static team problem considered in this section.
3.2. Existence of Optimal Strategies. In this subsection, we prove one of
the main results of the paper. We make the following assumption on the probability
measure on X × Y1:N .
Assumption 3.1. The spaces X ,Yi and U i are σ-compact Polish spaces for all
i ∈ [N ]. Further, there exist bounded continuous functions ηi and ρi, i ∈ [N ] such
that
P
{
dy1:N |x} = ∏
i∈[N ]
P
{
dyi|x} ,
P
{
dyi|x} = ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi),
P
{
dx|yi} = ρi(yi,x)νX (dx),
where νX and νYi are measures on X and Yi, respectively, for i ∈ [N ]. The tuples
(ρi, νX ) and (ηi, νYi), i ∈ [N ] satisfy Condition C1. 
We now use the auxiliary results in the previous subsection to prove the following
important theorem.
Theorem 3.7. Consider Team ST1, satisfying Assumption 3.1, where U i, i ∈
[N ] need not be compact sets. Let g ∈ Ub(X × Y1:N × U1:N ). For every i ∈ [N ],
let {λin}n∈N ⊂ ℘(U i × Yi × X ) be a convergent sequence of measures such that
λin(du
i, dyi, dx) = λin(du
i|yi)P{dx, dyi}, converging to some λi0 ∈ ℘(U i × Yi × X ).
Then,
lim
n→∞
∫
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
=
∫
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
.
Consequently, we have(
N∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
} w∗
⇀
(
N∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
as n→∞.
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Proof. See Appendix F.
We now list in the following assumption the conditions that we need in order to
establish the existence of optimal strategies.
Assumption 3.2.
1. The cost function c : X × Y1:N × U1:N → R+ is continuous in its arguments
and bounded from above.
2. The action sets U i, i ∈ [N ], of all the agents are compact subsets of Polish
spaces. Therefore, U i is σ-compact Polish space for all i ∈ [N ].
3. Assumption 3.1 holds.
Remark 3.2. If we assume that the cost function c is continuous and the spaces
X and Yi, i ∈ [N ] are compact subsets of Polish spaces, then the cost function is
bounded. 
Remark 3.3. It should also be noted that Part 3 of Assumption 3.2 is satisfied
if (i) X and Yi, i ∈ [N ] are finite dimensional Euclidean spaces, and (ii) the state
and observations are jointly Gaussian random variables such that Agent i observes a
Gaussian noise corrupted version of the state X. 
The following theorem states that any team problem that satisfies the assumptions
made above admits a team-optimal solution.
Theorem 3.8. Every static team problem satisfying Assumption 3.2 admits a
team-optimal solution in deterministic strategies.
Proof. Let {pi1:Nn }n∈N ⊂ R1:N be a sequence of strategy profiles of the agents
such that
J(pi1:Nn ) < inf
pi1:N∈R1:N
J(pi1:N ) +
1
n
.
We next show that there exists a convergent subsequence of this sequence {pi1:Nn }n∈N
such that the limiting behavioral strategies of the agents achieve the infimum of the
expected cost functional. We organize the proof into four steps.
Step 1: (Tightness) Since X and Yi are Polish spaces, P{dx, dyi} is a tight
measure. Since U i is compact, the set of measures {pii(dui|yi)P{dx, dyi}}pii∈Ri is
tight for all i ∈ [N ]. Define a measure λin as
λin(du
i, dyi, dx) := piin(du
i|yi)P{dx, dyi} , for n ∈ N, i ∈ [N ].
Step 2: (Extracting convergent subsequence) Recall that every sequence of tight
measures has a convergent subsequence by Prohorov’s theorem [29]. Thus, {λ1n}n∈N
must have a convergent subsequence, say {λ1nk}k∈N. Similarly, {λ2nk}k∈N must have a
convergent subsequence. Since there is only a finite number (N) of agents, we continue
this process of extracting convergent subsequences of every sequence of measures to
get a convergent subsequence of a set of measures {λ1nl , . . . , λNnl}l∈N such that
λinl
w∗
⇀ λi0, as l→∞ for all i ∈ [N ],
for some set of measures {λ10, . . . , λN0 }. Recall the result of Lemma 3.6, which implies
that λi0(dui, dyi, dx) = λi0(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dyi
}
. Define pii0(dui|yi) := λi0(dui|yi) for all
i ∈ [N ] and pi1:N0 := {pi10 , . . . , piN0 }.
Step 3: (Limit achieves infimum) The result of Theorem 3.7 implies that
lim
l→∞
J(pi1:Nnl ) = J(pi
1:N
0 ) = inf
pi1:N∈R1:N
J(pi1:N ).
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Step 4: (Applying a result on irrelevant information due to Blackwell) [30, 31]
Now, using Blackwell’s irrelevant information theorem (see e.g. [5, p. 457]), we
conclude that for fixed optimal behavioral strategies of all agents other than i, there
exists a deterministic strategy of Agent i that achieves the same value of expected
cost as the optimal behavioral strategy of Agent i. Thus, all agents’ strategies can be
restricted, without any loss of generality, to deterministic ones. This implies that the
static team admits an optimal solution in the class of deterministic strategies of the
agents. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 3.4. It must be noted that for the existence result proven above, we do
not require the state space X and observation spaces Yi, i ∈ [N ] to be compact. 
We have an immediate corollary.
Corollary 3.9. Assume that every Agent i ∈ [N ] observes Yi, which is inde-
pendent of the observations of all other agents. If the cost function is continuous in
its arguments (observations and actions of the agents) and bounded, and action spaces
of the agents are compact, then the static team with independent observations admits
an optimal solution in deterministic strategies.
3.3. Static Team ST1 with Degraded Information. In Assumption 3.1, we
assumed conditional independence of observations given the state, which we relax in
this subsection. For simplicity, we consider a two-agent static team problem, where
the observation of Agent 2 is a noise corrupted version of the observation of Agent
1. We further invoke the following assumption. The main results of Lemma 3.10 and
Theorem 3.11 below, and the main idea of the proof can be extended to multi-agent
static team scenarios.
Assumption 3.3. Consider Team ST1 in which Agent 2 observes a degraded
version of Agent 1’s observation. The spaces X , Yi and U i are σ-compact Polish
spaces for all i ∈ {1, 2}. There exist bounded continuous functions ηi and ρi, i ∈ {1, 2}
such that
P
{
dy2, dy1|x} = P{dy2|y1}P{dy1|x} ,
P
{
dy2|y1} = η2(y1,y2)νY2(dy2),
P
{
dy1|x,y2} = η1(x,y2,y1)νY1(dy1),
P
{
dy1, dx|y2} = ρ2(y2,y1,x)νY1(dy1)νX (dx),
P
{
dx|y1} = ρ1(y1,x)νX (dx),
where νX and νYi are measures on X and Yi, respectively, for i ∈ {1, 2}. The tuples
(ρ1, νX ), (ρ2, νX × νY1) and (ηi, νYi), i ∈ {1, 2} satisfy Condition C1. 
We now use the auxiliary results in the previous subsection to prove the following
important lemma.
Lemma 3.10. Consider Team ST1 satisfying Assumption 3.3, where U i, i ∈
{1, 2} need not be compact sets. Let X , Yi, U i, i ∈ {1, 2} be σ-compact Polish
spaces. Let g ∈ Ub(X × Y1:2 × U1:2). For every i ∈ {1, 2}, let {λ1n}n∈N ⊂ ℘(U i ×
Y1 × X ) and {λ2n}n∈N ⊂ ℘(U i × Y1 × Y2 × X ) be convergent sequences of mea-
sures such that λ1n(du1, dy1, dx) = λ1n(du1|y1)P
{
dx, dy1
}
and λ2n(du2, dy1:2, dx) =
λ2n(du
2|y2)P{dx, dy1:2}, converging to some λ10 ∈ ℘(U1 × Y1 ×X ) and λ20 ∈ ℘(U2 ×
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Y1 × Y2 ×X ), respectively. Then,
lim
n→∞
∫
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)
(
2∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
}
=
∫
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)
(
2∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
}
.
Consequently, we have(
2∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
} w∗
⇀
(
2∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
}
as n→∞.
Proof. See Appendix G.
We can now show the existence of optimal strategies for a static team ST1 sat-
isfying Parts 1 and 2 of Assumption 3.2, and Assumption 3.3.
Theorem 3.11. Any two-agent static team ST1 satisfying Parts 1 and 2 of
Assumption 3.2, and Assumption 3.3 admits a team-optimal solution, which is in the
class of deterministic strategies of the agents.
Proof. The proof follows by mimicking the steps of the proof of Theorem 3.8 and
using Lemma 3.10.
In the above theorem, we showed that an assumption of conditional independence
of observations given the state is not needed for the existence of optimal strategies in
team problems; we considered a case where the observation of one agent is a degraded
version of the observation of another agent and showed that optimal strategies exist
under certain assumptions.
We note that our setting does not cover teams with observation sharing infor-
mation structures, because the technique we employed for proving Theorem 3.8 does
not readily carry over to such teams. In particular, if the agents share their observa-
tions in a certain manner, then we cannot show the equicontinuity result of Lemma
3.4, which is used to prove Theorem 3.7. Recall that Theorem 3.7 is crucial for the
proof of Theorem 3.8. See Appendix A for a detailed discussion and a counterexam-
ple. However, for a class of problems with observation sharing information pattern,
it is possible to use other techniques, such as dynamic programming or viewing the
decision makers with common information as a single decision maker. We leave a
systematic analysis of this setup to future work.
This concludes the discussion in this section. In the next section, we extend the
ideas developed in this section to obtain sufficient conditions on a team problem with
non-compact action spaces and unbounded continuous cost function, for existence of
a team-optimal solution.
4. Existence of Optimal Solution in ST2. In this section, we consider the
static team problem in which the cost function is non-negative, continuous, but may
be unbounded, and the action sets may be non-compact. We build on the results
proved in the previous section to show the existence of optimal strategies of agents in
such a team problem.
In the next subsection, we use the result from Theorem 3.7 to investigate the
properties of the expected cost functional, as a function of the behavioral strategies of
the agents, of the team problem with unbounded cost and non-compact action spaces.
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4.1. Properties of the Expected Cost Functional. Our first result uses
Theorem 3.7 to prove an important property of expected cost functional of team
ST2.
Theorem 4.1. Recall that c : X×Y1:N×U1:N → R+ is a non-negative continuous
function. For every i ∈ [N ], let {λin}n∈N ⊂ ℘(U i × Yi × X ) be a convergent sequence
of measures such that λin(dui, dyi, dx) = λin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dyi
}
, converging to some
λi0 ∈ ℘(U i × Yi ×X ). If Assumption 3.1 holds, then for any m ∈ N,
lim
n→∞
∫
min{c,m}
(
N∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
=
∫
min{c,m}
(
N∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
.
Proof. Since Assumption 3.1 holds, we know from Lemma 3.6 that
λi0(du
i, dyi, dx) = λi0(du
i|yi)P{dx, dyi} .
The proof of this theorem then follows from Theorem 3.7.
This brings us to the following result.
Theorem 4.2. Under the same hypotheses and notation as in Theorem 4.1, we
have
lim inf
n→∞
∫
X×Y1:N×U1:N
c(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
N∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1:N}
≥
∫
X×Y1:N×U1:N
c(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
N∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1:N} .
Proof. See Appendix H.
The theorem above says that the expected cost functional of the agents in the
team is lower-semicontinuous on the space of behavioral strategies. Since the action
sets are non-compact, the set of joint measures over observation and action spaces of
each agent is non-compact, and we cannot readily use Weierstrass theorem like results
to prove the existence of an optimal solution.
We address this issue in the next subsection. In particular, if the cost function
has some stronger (coercivity like) property, then using Assumption 2.2 and Markov’s
inequality, we can restrict the search of optimal strategies of the agents to compact
sets of joint measures over observation and action spaces of the agents.
4.2. Compactness of a Set of Probability Measures. In this subsection,
we identify a sufficient condition for a set of measures to be precompact in the weak*
topology. We use this result later to show that the search for optimal behavioral
strategies of the agents in the team problem can be restricted to a weak* precompact
space.
Hereafter, we will use A, B and C to denote arbitrary Polish spaces. The following
theorem gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a subset of probability measures
on a Polish space A to be weak* precompact.
Theorem 4.3 (Prohorov’s Theorem). [32, Theorem 8.6.2, p. 202] A set M ⊂
℘(A) is weak* precompact if and only if it is tight, that is, for every  > 0, there exists
a compact set K ⊂ A such that µ(A \K) <  for all µ ∈M.
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We now define a class of functions and study an important result involving func-
tions in this class.
Definition 4.4 (Class IC(A,B)). We say that a non-negative measurable func-
tion φ : A×B×C → R is in class IC(A,B) if φ satisfies any one of the following two
conditions:
1. For every M > 0 and for every compact set K ⊂ A, there exists a compact
set L ⊂ B such that
inf
K×L{×C
φ(a,b, c) ≥M.
2. For every M > 0 and every point a ∈ A, there exists an open neighborhood
O ⊂ A of the point a ∈ A and a compact set L ⊂ B such that
inf
O×L{×C
φ(a,b, c) ≥M.
We can have C = ∅. 
A large class of team problems have cost functions that belong to the class of
functions defined above, where A is the space of primitive random variables and B is
an action space of some agent. This class of functions is therefore an important one,
and we will exploit this property of cost function to show the existence of an optimal
solution in a team. We first identify a few examples of functions in class IC(A,B).
Example 2. Let A = B = C = Rn, and define φ1(a,b, c) := ‖b − a‖ + ‖c‖ and
φ2(a,b, c) := ‖b − a‖2. Then, φ1 and φ2 are in class IC(A,B). Any non-negative
continuous and increasing function on R composed with φ1 or φ2 is also in class
IC(A,B). For example, exp(φ1(a,b, c)) and exp(φ2(a,b, c)) are in class IC(A,B).
Our next result gives a sufficient condition for a set of measures to be tight, which
uses the class of functions introduced in Definition 4.4.
Lemma 4.5 (Tightness of a set of Measures). Let φ : A × B × C → R be a
non-negative measurable function in the class IC(A,B). Fix k to be a non-negative
real number and let N ⊂ ℘(A) be a weak* compact set of measures. Define M ⊂
℘(A× B × C) as follows:
M =
{
µ ∈ ℘(A× B × C) : PrA#µ ∈ N and
∫
φ dµ ≤ k
}
.
Then, PrA×B# M is a tight set of measures. Furthermore, if φ is lower semicontinuous,
then PrA×B# M is weak* compact.
Proof. See Appendix I.
Now that we have a sufficient condition on when a set of measures is tight, we
can look at the original static team problem in the next subsection.
4.3. Existence of Optimal Strategies. We need the following assumption on
the cost function of the team.
Assumption 4.1. The cost function c : X ×Y1:N ×U1:N → R+ is a non-negative
continuous function in class IC(X × Y1:N ,U i) for every i ∈ [N ]. 
It should be noted that the conditions in Assumption 4.1 are not dependent on
the control strategies that the agents choose. The following lemma identifies a set of
tight measures using Lemma 4.5, with the property that any expected cost below a
certain threshold is either achieved by measures in that set or cannot be achieved.
Lemma 4.6. Assume that Team ST2 satisfies Assumptions 2.2 and 3.1. Let
p˜i1:N ∈ R1:N be the set of behavioral strategies of the agents which results in finite
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expected cost to the team. Consider sets Pi ⊂ Ri, i ∈ [N ] such that there exists a set
of behavioral strategies pi1:N ∈ P1:N satisfying J(pi1:N ) ≤ J(p˜i1:N ). Define
Mi :=
{
λi ∈ ℘(X × Yi × U i) : λi(dui, dyi, dx) = pii(dui|yi)P{dyi, dx} ,
pii ∈ Pi
}
, i ∈ [N ]
If the cost function of the team satisfies Assumption 4.1, thenMi ⊂ ℘(X × Yi × U i)
is a tight set of measures for all i ∈ [N ].
Proof. The statement of the lemma readily follows from Lemma 4.5. Define
M := {µ ∈ ℘(X × Y1:N × U1:N ) : ∫ c dµ ≤ J(p˜i1:N )}. For every i ∈ [N ], notice
that any λi ∈ Mi satisfies λi = PrX×Yi×Ui# µ for some µ ∈ M. Since c is in class
IC(X × Y1:N ,U i), by Lemma 4.5,Mi is tight.
Thus, we have identified pre-compact sets of joint measures Mi, i ∈ [N ] which
include the optimal joint measures, if they exist. This brings us to the following main
result of the section.
Theorem 4.7. Assume that the cost function of Team ST2 satisfies Assumption
4.1. If Assumptions 2.2 and 3.1 hold, then Team ST2 admits an optimal solution in
deterministic strategies.
Proof. Let p˜i1:N ∈ R1:N be the set of behavioral strategies of the agents which
results in finite expected cost to the team. From Lemma 4.6, we know that there exist
tight sets of measures Mi ⊂ ℘(X × Yi × U i), i ∈ [N ] that contain the optimal joint
measures, if they exist. Consider a sequence of behavioral strategies {pi1:Nn }n∈N ⊂
R1:N that satisfies
J(pi1:Nn ) ≤ J(p˜i1:N ), and lim
n→∞ J(pi
1:N
n ) = inf
pi1:N∈R1:N
J(pi1:N ).
Define λin(dui, dyi, dx) := piin(dui|yi)P
{
dyi, dx
}
for i ∈ [N ] and n ∈ N, and notice
that {λin}n∈N ⊂ Mi. Since {λin}n∈N is a tight sequence of measures, we know that
there exists a weak* convergent subsequence of measures. For every i ∈ [N ], let
{λink}k∈N be the weak* convergent subsequence of measures converging to λi0. From
Lemma 3.6, we know that
λi0(du
i, dyi, dx) = λi0(du
i|yi)P{dyi, dx}
for all i ∈ [N ], which means that the conditional independence property is retained
in the limit. Let pii0 ∈ Ri be such that pii0(dui|yi) = λi0(dui|yi). From the result of
Theorem 4.2, we conclude that lim inf
k→∞
J(pi1:Nnk ) ≥ J(pi1:N0 ). Thus, optimal behavioral
strategies of the agents exist, and the optimal behavioral strategy of Agent i is the
conditional measure λi0(dui|yi).
Moreover, applying Blackwell’s irrelevant information theorem [5, p. 457], there
exists a set of deterministic strategies which achieve the same cost as the one achieved
using optimal behavioral strategies of the agents. This completes the proof of the
theorem.
Corollary 4.8. Consider a two-agent static team ST2. Assume that the cost
function of Team ST2 satisfies Assumption 4.1. If Assumptions 2.2 and 3.3 hold,
then Team ST2 admits an optimal solution in deterministic strategies.
Proof. The proof follows from arguments similar to those used in the proof of
Theorems 3.11 and 4.7.
Corollary 4.9. Assume that the cost function of Team ST2 is continuous in
its arguments and the action spaces of the agents are compact subsets of Polish spaces.
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Furthermore, assume that Team ST2 satisfies Assumption 2.2. If either Assumption
3.1 or Assumption 3.3 holds for Team ST2, then the team admits an optimal solution
in deterministic strategies.
Proof. If the action spaces of the agents are compact, then the Assumption 4.1
on the cost function holds automatically. Then, we apply the result of Theorem 4.7
to establish the statement.
In the next section, we use Witsenhausen’s static reduction technique to convert
a class of dynamic team problems to static teams with independent observations,
and then apply the result proved in this section to conclude the existence of optimal
strategies in that class of dynamic team problems.
5. Dynamic Teams. It was shown in [14] that a large class of N -agent T -time
step dynamic stochastic control problems with certain information structures can be
equivalently written as NT -agent static optimization problems. In order to define the
equivalent static problem, we introduce the following notation:
Ω0 = X1 ×W01:T , Ωit =Wit , i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ].
We let ω0 and ωit denote generic elements of Ω0 and Ωit, respectively. Furthermore, we
assume that Ω0 and Ωit are measure spaces, endowed with the probability measures
ξΩ0 and ξΩit , respectively, which are defined as
ξΩ0 := ξX1ξW01 . . . ξW0T , ξΩit := ξWit , i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ].
With this notation, the cost function of the team problem is written as c : Ω0×Y1:N1:T ×
U1:N1:T → R+, and we assume that it is continuous. We assume that each agent only
observes Yit, that is, its information set is a singleton.
Now, using the static reduction argument, we can transform the original problem
to a static team problem with a different cost function. Toward this end, let us rewrite
the observations of the agents as
yit = h
i
t(ω0, ω
i
t,u
1:N
1:t−1). (5.1)
Note that due to Assumption 2.1, the functions hit, i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ] are continuous
maps of their arguments. We now make the following assumption.
Assumption 5.1. For every (i, t) ∈ [N ]× [T ], there exists a probability measure
νit ∈ ℘(Yit) and a continuous function ϕit : Yit × Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 → R+ such that
P
{
yit ∈ Y|ω0,u1:N1:t−1
}
=
∫
Y
ϕit(y
i
t;ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1)ν
i
t(dy
i
t) for all Y ∈ B(Yit).
Define ϕ : Ω0 × Y1:N1:T × U1:N1:T → R+ as
ϕ(ω0,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T ) :=
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
ϕit(y
i
t;ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1).
By definition, ϕ is a continuous function of its arguments. 
In the next lemma, we state a sufficient condition on the mapping hit and the
noise statistics ξΩit such that the above assumption is satisfied.
Lemma 5.1. Assume that all state, action, observation and noise spaces are
Euclidean spaces of appropriate dimensions. For all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], let
hit(ω0, ω
i
t,u
1:N
1:t−1) := hˇ
i
t(ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1) + ω
i
t,
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where hˇit is a continuous map of its arguments. If ξΩit admits a zero-mean Gaussian
density function ηit for all i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ], then Assumption 5.1 holds for the dynamic
team problem.
Proof. Note that ηit is strictly positive at all points in its domain Ωit, and Ωit = Yit .
For every i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], define ϕit and νit as
ϕit(y
i
t;ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1) :=
ηit(y
i
t − hˇit(ω0,u1:N1:t−1))
ηit(y
i
t)
, νit(dy
i
t) = η
i
t(y
i
t)dy
i
t.
Since hit is continuous, hˇit is a continuous map for all i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ]. Thus, ϕit is a
continuous map of its arguments. Furthermore, ϕit is strictly positive in its domain.
It is easy to see that with this definition,
P
{
yit ∈ Y|ω0,u1:N1:t−1
}
=
∫
Y
ϕit(y
i
t;ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1)ν
i
t(dy
i
t) for all Y ∈ B(Yit),
which establishes the statement.
We now define the reduced static team problem corresponding to the dynamic
team described above.
Definition 5.2 (Reduced static team problem). Consider the NT -agent static
team problem with the agents indexed as (i, t). Agent (i, t) observes a random variable
Yit with probability measure νit , which is independent of observations of all other
agents. Agent (i, t), based on the realization yit of its observation, chooses a control
action uit. The cost function for the team is given by
c(ω0,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T )ϕ(ω0,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T ).
We call the static team problem thus defined as reduced static team problem and refer
to it as RST problem. 
We now recall the following result from [14], which shows that any dynamic
problem and its corresponding reduced static problem are equivalent optimization
problems over the same space of strategies of the agents.
Theorem 5.3 ([14]). Let J : R1:N1:T → R+ be the expected cost functional of the
dynamic team problem, and JRST : R1:N1:T → R+ be the expected cost functional of the
corresponding reduced static team problem, defined as
JRST (pi
1:N
1:T ) =
∫
c ϕ
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
piit(du
i
t|yit)νit(dyit)P {dω0} , pi1:N1:T ∈ R1:N1:T .
Then, for any pi1:N1:T ∈ R1:N1:T , we have J(pi1:N1:T ) = JRST (pi1:N1:T ).
It should be noted that for any dynamic team problem that admits a reduced
static problem, the corresponding RST may not satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem
4.7. Thus, the results we proved for static teams cannot be applied to conclude the
existence of a solution to a dynamic team problem. We illustrate the difficulty in
using such a approach in the following example.
Witsenhausen’s Counterexample. Witsenhausen’s counterexample is a two-
agent dynamic LQG team problem, first studied by Witsenhausen in [10]. The first
agent observes a mean-zero unit variance Gaussian random variable y1 and decides
on a real number U1. The second agent observes Y2 := U1 + W2, where W2 is a
mean-zero Gaussian noise with unit variance, and decides on another real number U2.
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The behavioral strategy space of Agent i is Ri, i = 1, 2. The cost function of the
team is given by
cD(y1, u2, u2) = (u1 − y1)2 + (u2 − u1)2.
It is well known that the above dynamic team problem admits an optimal solution
[10]. The dynamic team problem can be reduced to a static team problem using
Lemma 5.1 [14]. In the corresponding RST problem, each agent observes a mean-zero
unit variance Gaussian random variable that is independent of the observation of the
other agent. The cost function for the RST is
cS(y1, u1, u2) =
(
(u1 − y1)2 + (u2 − u1)2
)
exp
(−u21 + 2y2u1
2
)
.
The cost function for the dynamic problem cD is in classes IC(Y1,U1) and IC(Y1×Y2×
U1,U2). The cost function cS for the corresponding RST is in class IC(Y1×Y2×U1,U2)
(which follows from Lemma 5.5 to be introduced and proved later). However, cS is
not in class IC(Y1,U1) because as |u1| → ∞, the cost goes to zero for any fixed value
of y1. Therefore, the result of Theorem 4.7 is not applicable to the RST problem.
The above example illustrates that the results we obtained for the static team
problems in Sections 3 and 4 are not readily applicable to all dynamic team problems
that admit static reductions. A certain structure on the cost function of a dynamic
team and further assumptions on the corresponding RST problem are needed to prove
the existence of a team-optimal solution. In the next subsection, we state the assump-
tions that we make on the dynamic team problem in order to establish existence.
5.1. Assumptions on Dynamic Team. In order to show the existence of
optimal strategies in dynamic teams, we assume the following structure.
Assumption 5.2.
1. The dynamic team problem satisfies Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 5.1.
2. The agents in the team do not share their observations with anyone. Any
agent who acts more than once does not recall its past observation(s).
3. The cost function c of the dynamic team problem is in the structural form
c(ω0,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T ) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
cit(u
i
t, ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1,y
1:N
1:t−1,y
i
t) + κ(ω0,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T ),
where cit is a non-negative and continuous function in the class IC(Ω0 ×
U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it ) for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], and κ is a non-negative
continuous function of its arguments.
4. For all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], the continuous function ϕit : Yit × Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 →
R+, as defined in Assumption 5.1, is strictly positive at all points in its do-
main.
In the rest of this section, we consider dynamic team problems satisfying As-
sumption 5.2. Let us first recall the following features of the corresponding RST
problem:
1. If the behavioral control strategy of Agent i at time t is piit, then the joint
measure on U it × Yit in the corresponding RST problem is piit(duit|yit)νit(dyit).
2. Recall from Assumption 2.2 that there exists a set of behavioral strategies
p˜i1:N1:T that achieves a finite cost J(p˜i
1:N
1:T ) in the dynamic team. Since RST and
dynamic team problems are equivalent problems (see Theorem 5.3), RST also
achieves the same cost with the behavioral strategies p˜i1:N1:T .
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Let {Pit ⊂ Rit}i∈[N ],t∈[T ] be the set of behavioral strategies of the agents such
that there exists pi1:N1:T satisfying pi
i
t ∈ Pit and
J(pi1:N1:T ) ≤ J(p˜i1:N1:T ).
Define λit(duit, dyit) := piit(duit|yit)νit(dyit) for piit ∈ Pit , and letMit denote the set of all
such λit.
If the optimal behavioral strategies of the agents exist, then the optimal behavioral
strategy of Agent (i, t) in the RST problem must lie in the setMit. In order to establish
the existence of optimal strategies in the dynamic team problem, we show that Mit
is a tight set of measures using a similar approach as in Lemma 4.6. In the next
subsection, we prove some auxiliary results that are needed to show that the set of
measures Mit is tight. This is a crucial part of the proof of existence of optimal
strategies in the dynamic team problem.
5.2. Auxiliary Results. Our first auxiliary result is as follows.
Lemma 5.4.
1. For any i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ] and any ω0 ∈ Ω0 and u1:N1:t−1 ∈ U1:N1:t−1, we have∫
Yit×Uit
ϕit(y
i
t;ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1)λ
i
t(du
i
t, dy
i
t) = 1.
2. For any i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ] and λit ∈ ℘(Yit × U it ),∫
Ω0×Y1:N1:T ×U1:N1:T
cit(u
i
t, ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1,y
1:N
1:t−1,y
i
t)ϕ(ω0,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T ) dλ
1:N
1:T P {dω0}
=
∫
Ω0×Y1:N1:t−1×U1:N1:t−1×Yit×Uit
c¯it(u
i
t, ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1,y
1:N
1:t−1,y
i
t) dλ
1:N
1:t−1 dλ
i
t P {dω0} ,
where
c¯it(u
i
t, ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1,y
1:N
1:t−1,y
i
t) = c
i
t(u
i
t, ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1,y
1:N
1:t−1,y
i
t)×
ϕit(y
i
t;ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1)×
t−1∏
s=1
N∏
j=1
ϕjs(y
j
s;ω0,u
1:N
1:s−1). (5.2)
Proof.
1. The statement holds for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ] by the definition of ϕit in
Assumption 5.1.
2. This is a consequence of the first statement.
Recall that we introduced a class of functions IC(·, ·) in Definition 4.4. In the next
lemma, we show that if we multiply a function in this class with a lower-semicontinuous
function that does not vanish in its domain, then the resulting function also belongs
to the same class. We use this result to show that the cost in (5.2) belongs to the
class IC(Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it ).
Lemma 5.5. Let φ1 : A×B → R be a measurable function and φ2 : A → R+ be a
lower-semicontinuous function that is strictly positive everywhere in its domain. If φ1
is in class IC(A,B), then the product function φ := φ1φ2 is also in class IC(A,B).
Proof. Fix m > 0 and a compact set K ⊂ A. Define M := mmina∈K φ2(a) . Then, by
the property of class IC(A,B) functions, there exists a compact set L ⊂ B, depending
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on K and M , such that
inf
K×L{
φ1(a,b) ≥M.
Now, due to the property of infimum, we get
inf
K×L{
φ(a,b) ≥ inf
K×L{
φ1(a,b) min
K
φ2(a) = m,
which completes the proof of the statement.
As a result of the lemma above, we have the following fact.
Lemma 5.6. The function c¯it, as defined in (5.2), is a non-negative and continu-
ous function in the class IC(Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it ).
Proof. By Assumption 5.2, cit(uit, ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit) is in the class IC(Ω0 ×
U1:N1:t−1 ×Y1:N1:t−1 ×Yit ,U it ). Now, in the statement of Lemma 5.5, take the functions φ1
and φ2 as
φ1(u
i
t, ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1,y
1:N
1:t−1,y
i
t) := c
i
t(u
i
t, ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1,y
1:N
1:t−1,y
i
t)
φ2(ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1,y
1:N
1:t−1,y
i
t) := ϕ
i
t(y
i
t;ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1)×
t−1∏
s=1
N∏
j=1
ϕjs(y
j
s;ω0,u
1:N
1:s−1),
and note that φ2 is a continuous and strictly positive function in its domain (see Part
4 of Assumption 5.2). As a consequence of the result in Lemma 5.5, we obtain that the
function c¯it is non-negative and continuous in the class IC(Ω0×U1:N1:t−1×Y1:N1:t−1×Yit ,U it ).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
We now have all the auxiliary results needed for showing existence. In the next
subsection, we prove that any dynamic team as described above admits a team-optimal
solution in deterministic strategies of the agents.
5.3. Proof of Existence of Optimal Strategies. Our first result in this sub-
section is thatMit is a tight set of measures for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ]. This implies
that during the search of optimal strategies of the agents in the RST problem, we can
restrict the joint measures on the action and observation spaces of Agent (i, t) to a
tight set of measuresMit.
Lemma 5.7. The set of measuresMit is tight for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ].
Proof. See Appendix J.
We now turn our attention to showing the existence of optimal strategies in dy-
namic team problems. We use the result of the lemma above to prove this fact in the
next theorem.
Theorem 5.8. If a dynamic team problem satisfies Assumption 5.2, then it
admits a team-optimal solution in deterministic strategies.
Proof. Consider a sequence of behavioral strategies of the agents {(pi1:N1:T )n}n∈N ⊂
M1:N1:T that satisfies limn→∞ J((pi1:N1:T )n) = inf J(pi1:N1:T ), where J is the expected cost
functional of the dynamic team problem. Let {(λit)n}n∈N ⊂Mit be defined as
(λit)n(du
i
t, dy
i
t) = (pi
i
t)n(du
i
t|yit)νit(dyit), n ∈ N.
Since {(λit)n}n∈N is a tight sequence of measures, we know that there exists a weak*
convergent subsequence of measures. For every i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], let {(λit)nk}k∈N
be the weak* convergent subsequence of measures converging to (λit)0. Define the
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behavioral strategy (piit)0(duit|yit) = (λit)0(duit|yit) for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ]. Since cϕ
is a continuous function, from the result of Theorem 4.2, we conclude that
lim inf
k→∞
∫
c ϕ d(λ1:N1:T )nkP {dω0} ≥
∫
c ϕ d(λ1:N1:T )0P {dω0} ,
or, equivalently, lim inf
k→∞
J((pi1:N1:T )nk) ≥ J((pi1:N1:T )0). Thus, optimal behavioral strategies
of the agents exist in the RST team problem, and the optimal behavioral strategy of
Agent (i, t) is the conditional measures (piit)0(dui|yi). Since RST is equivalent to a
dynamic team problem, this is also the optimal behavioral strategy of Agent i at time
t in the dynamic team problem.
Moreover, by Blackwell’s irrelevant information theorem [5, p. 457], there exists a
set of deterministic strategies which achieves the same cost as the one achieved using
optimal behavioral strategies of the agents, which establishes the result.
We have the following corollary to the theorem above for dynamic teams in which
the agents have compact action spaces. We do not require Parts 3 and 4 of Assumption
5.2 to show the existence of optimal strategies for this problem.
Corollary 5.9. Let us consider a dynamic team problem in which U it is compact
for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ]. If Parts 1 and 2 in Assumption 5.2 hold, then the dynamic
team problem admits an optimal solution in deterministic strategies of the agents.
Proof. As a result of Assumption 5.1, the dynamic team problem is equivalent to
a reduced static team problem defined in Definition 5.2. Note that due to the assump-
tion, the cost function of the reduced static team problem is continuous. Applying
the result of Corollary 4.9 to the reduced static team problem, we conclude that the
reduced problem admits an optimal solution in deterministic strategies. The optimal
strategy of Agent (i, t) in the reduced static team problem is also the optimal strategy
of Agent i at time step t in the dynamic team problem due to the equivalence of the
two team problems. This completes the proof of the theorem.
We now revisit Witsenhausen’s counterexample.
Revisiting Witsenhausen’s Counterexample. Recall that we were unable to
prove the existence of a solution to the corresponding RST problem of Witsenhausen’s
counterexample using the results we obtained for static team problems in Sections 3
and 4. We now outline the essential steps of the proof above adapted to the RST of
Witsenhausen’s counterexample.
Let ν1 ∈ ℘(Y1) and ν2 ∈ ℘(Y2) be probability measures that admit mean-zero
unit-variance Gaussian density functions. First note that if both agents apply zero
control, then the expected cost is E
[
Y 21
]
= 1, which is finite. Let R1 and R2 be
the behavioral strategy spaces of the first and the second controller, respectively. Let
P1 ⊂ R1 and P2 ⊂ R2 be the sets of behavioral strategies of the controllers such
that there exist pi1 ∈ P1 and pi2 ∈ P2 which yield J(pi1, pi2) ≤ 1. Now, the following
four steps lead to the existence of a team-optimal solution to this problem with non-
classical information.
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1. For any pi2 ∈ R2, we have∫
Y2×U2
cS pi2(du2|y2)ν2(dy2)
≥
∫
Y2×U2
(u1 − y1)2 exp
(−u21 + 2y2u1
2
)
1√
2pi
exp
(
−y
2
2
2
)
pi2(du2|y2)dy2,
= (u1 − y1)2
∫
Y2×U2
1√
2pi
exp
(−(y2 − u1)2
2
)
pi2(du2|y2)dy2
= (u1 − y1)2,
where the first inequality follows from dropping the quadratic term (u2−u1)2
from the expression of cS , the second equality is immediate, and the third
equality follows from the fact that
pi2(du2|y2) 1√
2pi
exp
(−(y2 − u1)2
2
)
dy2
is a probability measure over U2 × Y2. This is also a consequence of Lemma
5.4.
2. The function (u1−y1)2 is in class IC(Y1,U1) and (u2−u1)2 exp
(−u21+2y2u1
2
)
is in class IC(U1 × Y1 × Y2,U2) by Lemma 5.6.
3. The set of measuresMi, defined by
Mi :=
{
λi ∈ ℘(Yi × Ui) : λi(dui, dyi) = pii(dui|yi)νi(dyi), pii ∈ Pi
}
is tight for i ∈ {1, 2} by Lemma 5.7. The proof essentially uses Points 1 and
2 above, coupled with Lemma 4.5 in a sequential fashion. Using Point 1, we
conclude ∫
U1×Y1
(u1 − y1)2λ1(du1, dy1) ≤ E
[
Y 21
]
= 1
for all λ1 ∈ M1 (or equivalently pi1 ∈ P1). Then, using Point 2 and Lemma
4.5, we conclude that the set of measuresM1 is tight. Now, notice that∫
Y1:2×U1:2
(u2 − u1)2 exp
(−u21 + 2y2u1
2
)
dλ1 dλ2 ≤ E
[
Y 21
]
= 1.
Since M1 is tight and (u2 − u1)2 exp
(−u21+2y2u1
2
)
is in class IC(U1 × Y1 ×
Y2,U2) (see Point 2 above), we conclude thatM2 is tight by Lemma 4.5.
4. Finally, using same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.7, one can con-
clude that there exist optimal strategies of the agents.
Notice that the above proof of existence of a solution to Witsenhausen’s counterex-
ample is completely different from either of the proofs given in [10] and [16].
This concludes the discussion in this section. In the next section, we show the
existence of optimal solution in LQG team problems with “no observation sharing”
information structures using the results of this section.
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6. LQG Teams. We now consider a class of dynamic team problems in which
the state, action and observation spaces are Euclidean spaces, the state transition and
observation functions are linear, and the primitive random variables are mutually in-
dependent Gaussian random variables. In particular, we assume that the observation
equation for Agent (i, t) is given by
yit = h
i
t(ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1) + ω
i
t, (6.1)
where hit is a linear function of its arguments and ωit is a zero-mean Gaussian random
vector with positive definite covariance.
We assume that the cost function of the dynamic team problem is quadratic in
the actions of the agents and is of the following form:
c(ω0,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T ) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
‖uit − pit(ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit)‖2Rit
+κ(ω0,y
1:N
1:T ,u
1:N
1:T ), (6.2)
where {Rit}i∈[N ],t∈[T ] is a sequence of positive definite matrices of appropriate dimen-
sions, {pit : Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit → U it}i∈[N ],t∈[T ] is a sequence of continuous
functions1 and κ is a non-negative continuous function. We henceforth refer to teams
satisfying the above assumptions and having a cost function of the form (6.2) as LQG
team problems with no observation sharing, and address existence of team-optimal
solutions below.
We now turn our attention to showing the existence of optimal strategies in LQG
team problems with no observation sharing.
Theorem 6.1. Consider a dynamic LQG team problem as formulated above,
where the agents do not share their observations and the observation of each agent
as given by (6.1) is corrupted by additive Gaussian noise. If the cost is given by
(6.2), then the dynamic LQG team admits a team-optimal solution in deterministic
strategies.
Proof. In order to establish the result, we need to verify that all parts of Assump-
tion 5.2 are satisfied by the LQG team problem.
The linearity of state transition and observation equations implies that Assump-
tion 2.1 is satisfied and {hit}i∈[N ],t∈[T ], as defined in (6.1), are continuous functions.
If we apply zero control action, then the expected cost is finite because the cost
is quadratic in the primitive random variables and their distributions are Gaussian.
Thus, Assumption 2.2 is satisfied. Since the observation noises are additive and
Gaussian, Assumption 5.1 is satisfied. Furthermore, due to the Gaussian nature of
observation noise, we also conclude that ϕit is strictly positive at all points in its
domain for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ] (see the proof of Lemma 5.1).
The cost function c is continuous. Since pit is continuous, the function ‖uit −
pit(ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1,y
1:N
1:t−1,y
i
t)‖2Rit lies in the class IC(Ω0 × U
1:N
1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it ) for all
i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ]. The statement is then simply a consequence of Theorem 5.8.
We have thus identified conditions under which an LQG team problem admits an
optimal solution. In the next section, we consider a number of well-studied LQG team
problems from the literature and establish the existence of team-optimal strategies.
1In most cases of interest, {pit}i∈[N ],t∈[T ] are linear maps, which is the reason why we have called
this class of teams LQG, realizing that in general, with pit’s nonlinear, c is not going to be quadratic
in the uit’s.
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Existence of optimal strategies in some of the team problems formulated in the next
section is established here for the first time.
7. Examples. In this section, we present some examples of LQG teams with the
“no observation sharing” information structure. In all the examples, Theorem 6.1 leads
to the conclusion that team-optimal strategies exist. Except for scalar Witsenhausen’s
counterexample and the Gaussian test channel, existence of optimal strategies was not
known for any of the LQG teams considered in this section.
7.1. One-Agent Finite Horizon (Static Output Feedback) LQG prob-
lem. Consider a linear system in which all primitive random variables are Gaussian
and mutually independent of each other. The agent has a stagewise additive quadratic
cost function. The information available to the controller at time t is Yt, where
Yt = HtXt + Wt for some matrix Ht of appropriate dimensions, that is, we have a
static output feedback problem. The total cost to the controller is
c(x1:T+1,u1:T ) =
T∑
t=1
(
xTt+1Qxt+1 + u
T
tRut
)
, Q ≥ 0, R > 0.
Since this is an LQG problem with no sharing of observation, it satisfies both hy-
potheses of Theorem 6.1. Using Theorem 6.1, we then conclude that an optimal
static output feedback controller exists. This solution, however, need not be linear
[33].
7.2. The Gaussian Test Channel. The Gaussian test channel consists of an
encoder and a decoder. The source observes a zero mean Gaussian random variable
X1 with variance σ21 , which is encoded by the encoder (Agent 1), and the encoded
symbol U1 is sent across a noisy channel to a decoder. The additive noise W2 on
the channel is assumed to be a zero mean Gaussian random variable with variance
σ2w. The decoder (agent 2) observes the corrupted message Y2, and estimates the
realization of the random variable X1 available at the source. The decoder’s estimate
is denoted by U2.
y2
w2
γ1 γ2
x1 u1 u2
Figure 7.1. A figure depicting the unified setup of the Gaussian test channel and Witsen-
hausen’s counterexample from [19].
The information structure of the encoder is I11 = {X1} and of the decoder is
I22 = {Y2}. Thus, this is an example of a team with asymmetric information. Note
that the observation of Agent 2 satisfies the observation equation (6.1). Lemma 5.1
implies that this dynamic team problem admits a static reduction. The cost function
of the team of encoder and decoder is2
c(x1, u1, u2) = λu
2
1 + (u2 − x1)2, λ > 0.
One can check that the cost function of the team is of the form in (6.2). It is well
known that the optimal encoding and decoding strategies are linear in their arguments,
2For the Gaussian test channel, this corresponds to “soft-constrained” version; the standard
version has a second moment (hard) constraint on u1. One can show, however, that existence of an
optimal solution to one implies existence to the other, and vice versa.
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despite the fact that the information structure is non-nested. The only known proof
of this result (and therefore of the existence of a solution to this team problem) is an
indirect one, that uses information theoretic concepts; see, for example [19]. We now
have here another proof of the existence of team-optimal strategies to the Gaussian
test channel as a consequence of Theorem 6.1.
Remark 7.1. The existence result also holds for the more general two-agent LQG
problem introduced in [19], which subsumes the Gaussian test channel and Witsen-
hausen’s counterexample as special cases. For such extensions, see also [17].
7.3. Multidimensional Gaussian Test Channel and Witsenhausen’s Co-
unterexample. Consider the setup depicted in Figure 7.1, with a difference that all
random vectors take values in finite dimensional Euclidean spaces of appropriate di-
mensions. Furthermore, we assume thatW2 has a strictly positive definite covariance,
and the entries in W2 can be correlated. Consider the cost function of the team as
c(x1,u1,u2) = λ‖u1‖2 + ‖u2 −Hx1‖2, λ > 0,
where H is a matrix of appropriate dimensions.
It has been shown that under some specific assumptions on the covariance ma-
trix of the noise variable W2, optimal encoding and decoding schemes exist in the
multidimensional Gaussian test channel, again using information theoretic tools; see
[5, Section 11.2.3] and references therein for a review of such results. In particular, if
certain “matching conditions” hold, that is, if the rate distortion achieving transition
kernel is matched with the channel capacity achieving source distribution (see [34]
and Remark 11.2.1 in [5] in the context of Gaussian systems), then optimal encoding-
decoding strategies will exist.
As in the scalar case, the multidimensional Gaussian test channel admits static
reduction and the cost function has the same form as in (6.2). Theorem 6.1 implies
that optimal encoding-decoding strategies exist even if X1, U1 and U2 take values
in different Euclidean spaces. Thus, a large class of multidimensional Gaussian test
channel problems admits optimal solutions.
A vector version of Witsenhausen’s counterexample has also been studied recently
[35]. In this formulation, X1,U1,W1 and U2 are all vectors in Rn with primitive
random variables X1 and W1 being mutually independent Gaussian random vectors.
Until now, it was not known if vector versions of Witsenhausen’s counterexample
admit optimal solutions. We now know that the answer is in the affirmative, thanks
to Theorem 6.1.
7.4. A Gaussian Relay Channel. Consider now the Gaussian relay channel
depicted in Figure 7.2. It comprises an encoder, a certain number of relays and a
decoder. The encoder encodes its observation and transmits it over the communication
channel. The first relay receives the transmitted signal with an additive noise, re-
encodes it and transmits it to the next relay. Thereafter, each relay observes the signal
that is transmitted by the previous relay with an additive noise, re-encodes it and
transmits it to the next relay. The decoder receives an additive noise corrupted signal
transmitted by the last relay, and then decodes it to obtain the best possible estimate
of the encoder’s observation in the mean-square sense. All the primitive random
variables are assumed to be mutually independent and have Gaussian distributions.
This problem was formulated in [36] where the authors have shown that non-
linear strategies outperform linear strategies when there are two or more relays. Zaidi
et al. studied this problem in [37], and they showed that in fact, even with one relay,
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quantization based strategies outperform linear strategies of the agents. Thus, linear
strategies of encoder and decoder are optimal only in the case of the Gaussian test
channel discussed earlier, but not in the case of the Gaussian relay channel.
y2 yN
w2 w3 wN
γ1 γ2 γN
u1 u2 uNx1 y1
w1
Figure 7.2. A figure depicting the arrangement of encoder, relays, and decoder in the Gaussian
relay channel. Agent 1 is the encoder, Agent N is the decoder while Agents 2 to N − 1 are relays in
the figure.
For a concrete formulation of the problem, assume that there are N − 2 relays
and all state, action, noise and observation spaces are the real line. The encoder
observes a noise corrupted version of zero-mean Gaussian random variable, X1, with
variance σ21 . The observation noise of the encoder denoted byW1 and the observation
of the encoder is Y1 := X1 + W1. The encoder’s information is I1 = {Y1} and
the action of the encoder is U1. For i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}, the ith relay receives a
noise corrupted version of the transmitted signal, denoted by Yi := Ui−1 + Wi, and
Ii = {Yi}. The ith relay outputs Ui. Finally, the decoder receives YN and outputs UN ,
which is an estimate of the realization of the random variable X1. The noise variables
Wi, i ∈ [N ] are assumed to be pairwise independent, mean-zero Gaussian random
variables with some specified variances and independent of the random variable X1.
Since the observations of the Agents 2, . . . , N − 1 satisfy the observation equation
(6.1), we conclude that the dynamic team problem admits a static reduction using
Lemma 5.1. The cost function c of the team is
c(x1, u1:N ) = (uN − x1)2 +
N−1∑
i=1
λiu
2
i , λi > 0.
As we mentioned earlier, it is known for this problem that for any number of relays,
non-linear strategies outperform best linear ones. However, it is not known whether
there exist optimal strategies for the agents.
Since the problem admits a static reduction and the cost function of the team is
of the form in (6.2), we conclude that optimal encoding, decoding and relay strategies
exist for this problem by the result of Theorem 6.1. It is not difficult to see that
the same line of reasoning (along with Theorem 6.1) applies to prove that optimal
strategies exist for agents in a vector version of this problem as well, where all random
variables take values in appropriate dimensional Euclidean spaces (not necessarily of
the same dimensions).
8. Conclusion. In this paper, we have identified a set of sufficient conditions
on a stochastic team problem with “no observation sharing” information structure
that guarantee an optimal solution to the team problem. In particular, in a static
team problem, if the cost function is continuous and has a certain structure, and the
observation channels satisfy certain technical conditions, then there exists an optimal
solution.
We used Witsenhausen’s static reduction technique to obtain a similar result
for a class of dynamic team problems with no sharing of observations among the
agents. Furthermore, we proved that LQG team problems with no sharing of ob-
servations admit team-optimal solutions under some technical conditions on the cost
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functions. As a consequence of one of the main results of the paper, we also showed
that several dynamic LQG team problems from the literature admit team-optimal
solutions. The approach developed in the paper and the specific results obtained
settle for good a number of open questions on the existence of optimal strategies in
dynamic teams. Furthermore, the results of this paper can be applied to optimal real-
time coding/decoding problems to prove the existence of optimal strategies, where it
has not been known earlier if optimal policies exist and the few special cases where
such results exist have relied on strict information theoretic source-channel matching
conditions.
As for the future work, one goal is to obtain approximately optimal policies and
numerical techniques to make such optimization problems tractable. Another goal is
to obtain explicit analytical solutions for some classes of dynamic teams. Obtaining
conditions under which a team-optimal solution exists in a team with “observation
sharing” information structure is also an important area for further research. Finally,
informational aspects of non-cooperative stochastic games is a further relevant area
of study.
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Appendix A. A Team with Observation Sharing: A Counterexample. In
this appendix, we consider a two-agent static team problem in which the observation
of Agent 2 is shared with Agent 1. The purpose of this counterexample is to illustrate
that weak* topology on the space of joint measures of agents’ actions and information
is not sufficient for the existence of optimal strategies in teams with observation
sharing information structures.
Let Y1 = Y2 = [0, 1] and U1 = U2 = {0, 1}. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Y i be a uniformly
distributed random variable taking values in Yi that is observed by Agent i. Further,
assume that Y 1 and Y 2 are mutually independent random variables. Take the cost
function of the team as
c(y1:2, u1:2) = u1(1− u2).
Note that the cost is a non-negative, continuous, and bounded function of its ar-
guments. Agent 1 decides on u1 based on the realizations y1 and y2, and Agent 2
decides on u2 based on the realization y2. We show that if we take weak* convergent
sequences of measures {pi1n(du1|y1, y2)dy1 dy2}n∈N and {pi2n(du2|y2)dy2}n∈N that pre-
serve informational constraints in the limit, then the corresponding sequence of joint
measures over observations and actions of both agents, that is,{
pi1n(du
1|y1, y2)pi2n(du2|y2)dy1 dy2
}
n∈N
may not converge in the weak* limit. Consequently, a result similar to that of Theorem
3.7 may not hold for static teams with observation sharing information structures.
This also shows that we need stronger assumptions on the underlying distributions
of the primitive random variables and topologies on the measure spaces to show the
existence of optimal strategies in teams with observation sharing information patterns.
We now construct the sequences {pi1n}n∈N and {pi2n}n∈N. For any n ∈ N, define
hn : [0, 1]→ {0, 1} as
hn(y) =
{
1 if [2ny] is even
0 otherwise.
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Define An ⊂ [0, 1] as
An = {1} ∪
2n−1−1⋃
k=0
[2k
2n
,
2k + 1
2n
)
. (A.1)
Then, hn(y) = 1 for all y ∈ An and 0 otherwise. Note that Lebesgue measures of An
and A{n are equal and
1
2 . Consider sequences of strategies of Agents 1 and 2, given by
pi1n(du
1|y1, y2) = 1{hn(y1)hn(y2)}(du1), pi2n(du2|y2) = 1{hn(y2)}(du2), n ∈ N.
We have the following result, the proof of which is omitted.
Lemma A.1. The sequences of joint measures {pi1n(du1|y1, y2)dy1dy2}n∈N and
{pi2n(du2|y2)dy2}n∈N converge in the weak* sense, respectively, to
pi10(du
1|y1, y2)dy1dy2 =
(
3
4
1{0}(du1) +
1
4
1{1}(du1)
)
dy1dy2,
pi20(du
2|y2)dy2 =
(
1
2
1{0}(du2) +
1
2
1{1}(du2)
)
dy2.
Note that u1 and u2 are independent of the realizations y1 and y2 in the limit.
For any natural number n, we have∫
c(y1, y2, u1, u2)pi1n(du
1|y1, y2)pi2n(du2|y2)dy1dy2
=
∫
c(y1, y2, hn(y
1)hn(y
2), hn(y
2))dy1dy2,
= hn(y
1)hn(y
2)(1− hn(y2)) = 0.
However, in the limit∫
c(y1, y2, u1, u2)pi10(du
1|y1, y2)pi20(du2|y2)dy1dy2 = P
{
u1 = 1, u2 = 0
}
=
1
8
.
Hence, the sequence of measures
{
pi1n(du
1|y1, y2)pi2n(du2|y2)dy1dy2
}
n∈N
does not con-
verge to pi10(du1|y1, y2)pi20(du2|y2)dy1 dy2 in the weak* topology.
Our analysis and existence result built upon the properties of weak* convergent
sequence of measures. It is evident from the above counterexample that this con-
vergence notion is not sufficient, and a stronger notion of topologies on the measure
spaces is needed to show the existence of solutions to teams with observation sharing
information structures3. We leave this topic for future research.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 3.2. Since g is uniformly continuous, we can
assume that for every  > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for all a0 ∈ A, c0 ∈ C and
a ∈ A, c ∈ C satisfying dA(a,a0) < δ, dC(c, c0) < δ, we have
sup
b∈B
|g(a,b, c)− g(a0,b, c0)| < 2.
3Certain instances of such information structures can be viewed as centralized information struc-
tures [11], albeit over a much larger state and action spaces of the agents.
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Let M := supa∈A
∫
h(η,ν)dν < ∞. Consider any probability measure µ ∈ ℘(Y × B).
Then, we get
|fµ(a, c)− fµ(a0, c0)|
=
∣∣∣∣∫Y×B g(a,b, c)µ(db|y)η(a,y)ν(dy)−
∫
Y×B
g(a0,b, c0)µ(db|y)η(a0,y)ν(dy)
∣∣∣∣ ,
≤
∫
Y×B
∣∣∣g(a,b, c)η(a,y)− g(a0,b, c0)η(a0,y)∣∣∣µ(db|y)ν(dy),
≤ ‖g‖∞M+
∫
Y×B
∣∣∣g(a,b, c)− g(a0,b, c0)∣∣∣µ(db|y)η(a0,y)ν(dy),
< (‖g‖∞M + 2).
Also notice that {fµ(·, ·)}µ∈℘(Y×B) is bounded by ‖g‖∞. This completes the proof of
the lemma.
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 3.4. We mimic the steps of the proof of Lemma
3.2 to prove this statement. First notice that {fµ1:N (·, ·)}µi∈℘(Yi×Bi) is uniformly
bounded by ‖g‖∞. Now, we prove that this family of functions is equicontinuous.
Let us define η, M and ν as
η(a,y1:N ) :=
N∏
i=1
ηi(a,yi), M = max
i∈[N ]
sup
a∈A
∫
Yi
hidνi, ν(dy1:N ) =
N∏
i=1
νi(dyi).
First, note that for any a ∈ A and i ∈ [N ],∫
Yi
ηi(a,yi)νi(dyi) =
∫
Yi
P
{
dyi|a} = 1. (C.1)
Let  > 0. Let δi > 0 be such that for any dA(a,a0) < δi, we have
|ηi(a,yi)− ηi(a0,yi)| <  hi(a0,yi).
Pick δ = mini∈[N ] δi. Fix a0 ∈ A. Now, for a ∈ A such that dA(a,a0) < δ, notice the
following:∣∣η(a,y1:N )− η(a0,y1:N )∣∣
≤
N∑
j=1
j−1∏
i=1
ηi(a0,y
i)
∣∣∣ (ηj(a,yj)− ηj(a0,yj)) ∣∣∣ N∏
i=j+1
ηi(a,yi)

≤ 
 N∑
j=1
j−1∏
i=1
ηi(a0,y
i)
N∏
i=j+1
ηi(a,yi)
hj(a0,yj)
 ,
where terms with
∏0
i=1 and
∏N
i=N+1 are replaced by 1. Using the above expression,
we get∣∣∣∣∣
∫
B1:N×Y1:N
g(a,b1:N , c)
(
N∏
i=1
µi(dbi|yi)
)(
η(a,y1:N )− η(a0,y1:N )
)
ν(dy1:N )
∣∣∣∣∣
< ‖g‖∞
N∑
j=1
∫
Y1:N
j−1∏
i=1
(ηi(a0,y
i)dνi)
N∏
i=j+1
(ηi(a,yi)dνi)
hj(a0,yj)dνj
≤ ‖g‖∞NM, (C.2)
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where we used (C.1). Since g is uniformly continuous, for every  > 0, there exists
a δ > 0 such that for all a0 ∈ A, c0 ∈ C and a ∈ A, c ∈ C satisfying dA(a,a0) < δ,
dC(c, c0) < δ, we have
sup
b1:N∈B1:N
|g(a,b1:N , c)− g(a0,b1:N , c0)| < 2.
Using the inequality above and (C.2), one can show that
|fµ1:N (a, c)− fµ1:N (a0, c0)| < (‖g‖∞NM + 2),
which establishes the result.
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 3.5. In order to prove the lemma, we first
need the following result.
Lemma D.1. Let A be a Polish space. Let {hn : A → R}n∈N be a convergent
sequence of continuous and uniformly bounded functions and h0 : A → R be a contin-
uous function such that for any compact subset A ⊂ A, supa∈A |hn(a)−h0(a)| → 0 as
n → ∞. Let {µn}n∈N∪{0} ⊂ ℘(A) be a weak* convergent sequence of measures such
that µn
w∗
⇀ µ0 as n→∞. Then,
lim
n→∞
∫
A
hndµn =
∫
A
h0dµ0, and lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
hndµ0
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Proof. Since {µn}n∈N is a weak* convergent sequence, it is tight, which further
implies that for any  > 0, there exists a compact set A ⊂ A such that µn(A{ ) < 
for every n ∈ N∪{0}. Fix  > 0. Since hn converges uniformly to h0 over the compact
set A, there exists N,1 ∈ N such that
|hn(a)− h0(a)| < , for all a ∈ A and n ≥ N,1.
Let M be the uniform bound on the sequence of functions {hn}n∈N. Then, ‖h0‖∞ ≤
M . Thus, for any n ≥ N,1, we get∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
h0dµn
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫
A
|hn(a)− h0(a)|dµn(a) +
∫
A{
|hn(a)− h0(a)|dµn(a)
< (1 + 2M). (D.1)
By the definition of weak* convergence of measures, there exists N,2 ∈ N such that∣∣∣∣∫A h0dµn −
∫
A
h0dµ0
∣∣∣∣ <  for all n ≥ N,2.
Take N = max{N,1, N,2}. Now, for n > N, we have∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
h0dµ0
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
h0dµn
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∫A h0dµn −
∫
A
h0dµ0
∣∣∣∣
< 2(1 +M). (D.2)
Now, consider the following inequalities for n ≥ N:∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
hndµ0
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
h0dµ0
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∫A h0dµ0 −
∫
A
hndµ0
∣∣∣∣
< 2(1 +M)+ (1 + 2M) = (3 + 4M),
31
where the first inequality is just the triangle inequality on the real line, whereas the
second inequality follows from (D.1) and (D.2). This completes the proof of the
lemma.
Now, we turn our attention to the proof of Lemma 3.5, which is done in two steps:
Step 1: By Lemma 3.4, we know that {fn} is a sequence of uniformly equicon-
tinuous and uniformly bounded functions. In this step, we show that there exists a
subsequence {fnk}k∈N and f0 ∈ Cb(A × C) such that fnk converges to f0 uniformly
over any compact set in A× C.
Since A × C is σ-compact, there exists a countable collection of compact sets
Kn ⊂ A × C such that A × C = ∪n∈NKn. Let Lm = ∪mk=1Kk. By the Arzela-Ascoli
Theorem [28], for every m ∈ N, there exists a convergent subsequence {fnmk }k∈N and
a continuous function fm0 : Lm → R such that sup(a,c)∈Lm |fnmk (a, c)− fm0 (a, c)| → 0
as k →∞. We can take {nm+1k }k∈N to be a subsequence of {nmk }k∈N for every m ∈ N.
Now, since Lm ⊂ Lm+1, we conclude that fm0 agrees with fm+10 on set Lm for every
m ∈ N. Using Cantor’s diagonalization argument, we get a subsequence {fnk}k∈N
and a continuous function f0 such that fnk → f0, where the convergence is uniform
over any compact set in A×C. Furthermore, since fn is uniformly bounded, f0 is also
bounded.
Step 2: Using the result of Lemma D.1, we get
lim
k→∞
∣∣∣∣∫A×C fnkdζnk −
∫
A×C
fnkdζ0
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
This establishes the statement of Lemma 3.5.
Appendix E. Proof of Lemma 3.6. First, note that since pullback of a measure
is a continuous operation [23], PrB×C# µn → PrB×C# µ0. Pick any g ∈ Ub(A × B × C)
and note that (b, c) 7→ ∫A g(a,b, c)ρ(a,b)ν(da) is a bounded uniformly continuous
function from Corollary 3.3. This gives∫
gdµ0 = lim
n→∞
∫
gdµn
= lim
n→∞
∫
B×C
(∫
A
g(a,b, c)ρ(a,b)ν(da)
)
PrB×C# µn(db, dc),
=
∫
B×C
(∫
A
g(a,b, c)ρ(a,b)ν(da)
)
PrB×C# µ0(db, dc),
where we used disintegration of measures. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 3.7. Let us define a functional J˜ as:
J˜(λ1:N ) :=
∫
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=1
λi(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
,
where λi ∈ ℘(U i×Yi×X ). We proceed with the proof in two steps. In the first step, we
show that there exists a subsequence {nk}k∈N such that limk→∞ J˜(λ1:Nnk ) = J˜(λ1:N0 ).
Then, we show that limn→∞ J˜(λ1:Nn ) = J˜(λ1:N0 ) using the first step.
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Step 1: Consider the expressions,∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
−
∫
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
} ∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ N∑
j=1
∫
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
j−1∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)
) N∏
i=j+1
λin(du
i|yi)

(
λjn(du
j |yj)− λj0(duj |yj)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
} ∣∣∣∣
≤
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
j−1∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
)
 N∏
i=j+1
λin(du
i|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
(λjn(duj , dyj , dx)− λj0(duj , dyj , dx))∣∣∣∣,(F.1)
where the integration is taken over the space X × Y1:N × U1:N . Replace the product
terms
∏0
i=1 and
∏N
i=N+1 by 1 in those expressions. In the statements of Lemma 3.2
and its corollary and Lemma 3.4, take B = U i×Yi for an appropriate index i, replace
A by X and C by appropriate product spaces.
Applying Corollary 3.3, we conclude that the function∫
U1:j−1×Y1:j−1
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
j−1∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
)
is uniformly continuous in x, yj:N and uj:N . Next, we use Lemma 3.4 to conclude
that the sequence of functions{∫
U−j×Y−j
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
j−1∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi) N∏
i=j+1
λin(du
i|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
}
n∈N
is uniformly equicontinuous and bounded on X × Yj × Uj for every j ∈ [N ]. Then,
there exists a subsequence {nl}l∈N by Lemma 3.5 for j = 1 such that as l→∞,∣∣∣∣ ∫
(
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=2
λinl(du
i|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
))
(
λ1nl(du
1, dy1, dx)− λ10(du1, dyi, dx)
) ∣∣∣∣→ 0.
Along the sequence {nl}l∈N, there exists a further subsequence {nlm}m∈N for j = 2
such that second term in the summation in (F.1) goes to zero as k →∞. Continue this
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process for j = 3, . . . , N to arrive at a subsequence {nk}k∈N such that each component
of the sum in (F.1) converges to 0 as k →∞. Thus, we get
lim
k→∞
J˜(λ1:Nnk ) = J˜(λ
1:N
0 ).
Step 2: We now claim that limn→∞ J˜(λ1:Nn ) = J˜(λ1:N0 ), which we prove by con-
tradiction. Suppose that limn→∞ J˜(λ1:Nn ) does not exist or is not equal to J˜(λ1:N0 ).
In this case, there exists an 0 > 0 and a subsequence {nm}m∈N such that
|J˜(λ1:Nnm )− J˜(λ1:N0 )| > 0 for all m ∈ N.
From Step 1 of the proof, we know that there exists a further subsequence {nmk}k∈N
such that
lim
k→∞
J˜(λ1:Nnmk
) = J˜(λ1:N0 ),
which is a contradiction. Thus, limn→∞ J˜(λ1:Nn ) = J˜(λ1:N0 ), which completes the
proof of the first part of the theorem.
Since the first part of the lemma holds for all uniformly continuous functions, we
arrive at the second result by [38, Theorem 9.1.5, p. 372].
Appendix G. Proof of Lemma 3.10. First, note that the information con-
straints of the limits λ10 and λ20 are satisfied due to Assumption 3.3 and Lemma 3.6.
To establish the result, we follow the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 3.7 in
Appendix F above with some minor modifications. Consider the following expressions:∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)
(
2∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
}
−
∫
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)
(
2∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
} ∣∣∣∣ (G.1)
≤
∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ2n(du2|y2) (λ1n(du1|y1)− λ10(du1|y1))P{dx, dy1:2} ∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ10(du1|y1) (λ2n(du2|y2)− λ20(du2|y2))P{dx, dy1:2} ∣∣∣∣,
where the integration is taken over the space X × Y1:2 × U1:2. We use Lemma 3.2 to
conclude that the sequence of functions{∫
U2×Y2
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ2n(du
2|y2)η2(y1,y2)νY2(dy2)
}
n∈N
is uniformly equicontinuous and bounded on X × Y1 × U1. Then, there exists a
subsequence {nl}l∈N by Lemma 3.5 such that as l→∞,∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ2nl(du2|y2) (λ1nl(du1|y1)− λ10(du1|y1))P{dx, dy1:2} ∣∣∣∣→ 0.
We now apply Corollary 3.3 to conclude that the function∫
U1×Y1
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ10(du
1|y1)η1(x,y2,y1)νY1(dy1)
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is uniformly continuous in x, y2 and u2. Thus, as l→∞, we get∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ10(du1|y1) (λ2nl(du2|y2)− λ20(du2|y2))P{dx, dy1:2} ∣∣∣∣→ 0.
This implies that along the subsequence {nl}l∈N, (G.1) converges to 0 as l→∞. We
can now mimic Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.7 in Appendix F to complete the
proof of the lemma.
Appendix H. Proof of Theorem 4.2. By Theorem 4.1,
lim
n→∞
∫
(min{c,m})
N∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1:N}
=
∫
(min{c,m})
N∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1:N} for all m ∈ N.
Notice that min{c,m} ↗ c as m→∞. We get
lim inf
n→∞
∫
c
N∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1:N}
≥ lim inf
k→∞
∫
min{c,m}
N∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1:N}
=
∫
(min{c,m})
N∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1:N} .
The left-side of the equation is independent of m and the right-side of the equation
holds for anym ∈ N. Taking the limit asm→∞ and using the monotone convergence
theorem, we get
lim inf
n→∞
∫
c
N∏
i=1
λin(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1:N} ≥ ∫ c N∏
i=1
λi0(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1:N} .
This establishes the theorem.
Appendix I. Proof of Lemma 4.5. First, we recall a general version of
Markov’s inequality.
Lemma I.1 (Generalized Markov’s Inequality). Let φ : A → R be a non-negative
measurable function and A ⊂ A be a Borel measurable set such that infa∈A φ(a) > 0.
Then,
P {A} ≤ E [φ1A]
infa∈A φ(a)
.
Proof. Note that (infa∈A φ(a))1A(a) ≤ φ(a)1A(a) for all a ∈ A. Taking expec-
tations on both sides leads us to the result.
We want to show that the set of measures in M is tight. Toward this end, we
fix  > 0, and show that there exist compact sets K ⊂ A and L ⊂ B such that
PrA×B# µ(K ×L) = µ(K ×L × C) > 1− 2 for all µ ∈M. This proves that the set
of measuresM is tight.
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Since the set of measures N is tight, there exists a compact set K ⊂ A such that
ζ(K{ ) <  for all ζ ∈ N . Pick M ∈ R+ sufficiently large such that M > k/. We
carry out the analysis for the two cases separately.
1. Assume that φ satisfies the first condition in Definition 4.4. Given M and
K, let L ⊂ B be the compact set such that
inf
(a,b,c)∈(K×L{×C)
φ(a,b, c) ≥M.
Now note that µ(K{ × B × C) <  for all Borel sets B ⊂ B. Let E =
(K × L){ × C and note that E = (K × L{ × C)
⋃
(K{ × B × C).
Define E1 = K × L{ × C and E2 = (K{ × B × C). It is easy to verify that
E1
⋂
E2 = ∅. We now use generalized Markov’s inequality (Lemma I.1) to get
µ(K × L{ × C) = µ(E1) ≤
E [φ1E1 ]
infx∈E1 φ(x)
≤ k
M
< 
for all µ ∈ M, where 1E1 is the indicator function over the set E1. By the
additivity property of probability measures, we get µ(E) = µ(E1)+µ(E2) < 2.
2. Now suppose that φ satisfies the second assumption. For every a ∈ K, let
Oa ⊂ A be the open neighborhood of a ∈ K and La ⊂ B be the compact set
in B such that
inf
(a,b,c)∈(Oa×L{a×C)
φ(a,b, c) ≥M.
Notice that {Oa}a∈K is an open cover for K. By the definition of com-
pactness, there exists a finite subcover, say {Oaj}nj=1, such that K ⊂ O :=⋃n
j=1 Oaj . Define L :=
⋃n
j=1 Laj ⊂ B, which is a compact set in B. Since
Laj ⊂ L, we get Oaj × L{ ⊂ Oaj × L{aj and as a result of this inclusion, we
conclude
inf
(a,b,c)∈(Oaj×L{×C)
φ(a,b, c) ≥ inf
(a,b,c)∈(Oaj×L{aj×C)
φ(a,b, c) ≥M,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Notice that ⋃nj=1(Oaj ×L{ ) = O×L{ . Since over each
set Oaj × L{ , the infimum of φ is greater than or equal to M , we conclude
that
inf
(a,b,c)∈(O×L{×C)
φ(a,b, c) ≥M.
Now again define E := (K×L){×C, E1 := O×L{ ×C, E2 := (K{ ×B×C),
and note that E ( E1
⋃
E2. By a similar argument as in Part 1 of this proof,
we conclude that µ(E1) <  and µ(E2) < , which means µ(E) < 2.
Note that K ×L is a compact set in A×B and its complement has small measure.
Thus, we conclude that the set of probability measures PrA×B# M is tight.
If φ is lower semi-continuous, then µ 7→ ∫ φ dµ is a lower semi-continuous func-
tional [24, Lemma 4.3]. Thus, we conclude that M is in fact weak* closed, and
thereforeM is weak* compact. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Appendix J. Proof of Lemma 5.7. Assumption 2.2 and the structure of the
cost function of the team as defined in (5.2) imply that for any i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ],
36
we have∫
Ω0×Y1:N1:t−1×U1:N1:t−1×Yit×Uit
c¯it(u
i
t, ω0,u
1:N
1:t−1,y
1:N
1:t−1,y
i
t) dλ
1:N
1:t−1 dλ
i
t P {dω0} ≤ J(p˜i1:N1:T )
for any choice of λ1:N1:T ∈ N 1:N1:T . Also recall from Lemma 5.6 that c¯it is in class IC(Ω0×
U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it ). We now use the result of Lemma 4.5 and the principle of
mathematical induction to prove the result.
Step 1: Consider Agent (1, 1). We know that c¯11 is a non-negative continuous
function in class IC(Ω0 ×Y11 ,U11 ). Moreover, the measure on Ω0 ×Y11 is tight. Using
the result of Lemma 4.5, we get that N 11 is a tight set of measures.
Step 2: Using the same argument as in Step 1, we conclude that Mi1 is a tight
set of measures for all i ∈ [N ].
Step 3: Let us assume that Mis is a tight set of measures for all i ∈ [N ] and
1 ≤ s ≤ t−1. Consider any Agent (i, t). We know that c¯it is a non-negative continuous
function in class IC(Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it ). Moreover, the set of all possible
measures on Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 induced by N 1:N1:t−1 is tight becauseMis is tight for
all i ∈ [N ] and 1 ≤ s ≤ t− 1 by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, using the result
of Lemma 4.5, we get thatMit is a tight set of measures.
This completes the induction step and we conclude thatMit is tight for all i ∈ [N ]
and t ∈ [T ]. This completes the proof of the lemma.
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